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Abstract 
The June 2003 release of the radically-revised CJCSI 3170.01C and CJCSM 
3170.01 promulgating the new Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
(JCIDS) literally turned the legacy Service-initiated Requirements Generation System 
(RGS) upside down.  The decades-old “threat-driven,” “bottom-up” development 
process of warfare-materiel requirements was summarily replaced by a “revolutionary,” 
“capabilities-driven,” “top-down” process.   The author provides an analysis, from a 
Program Manager’s (PM) perspective, of the potential impacts of these changes upon 
the acquisition community in four distinct areas:  Continuity with Service legacy  
requirements generation expertise,  PM management challenges when other PMs are 
responsible for supplying critical subsystems and components that will enable 
satisfaction of Key Performance Parameters,  Total Ownership Cost implications of 
deploying multiple, low-density materiel configurations,  and potential disconnections 
between Presidential Budget Requests and Congressional enactment.   
Key Words: Project Management, Program Management, JCIDS, Requirements 
Generation 
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I. Introduction 
The June 2003 release of the radically-revised CJCSI 3170.01C and CJCSM 
3170.01 promulgating the new Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
(JCIDS) literally turned the legacy Requirements Generation System (RGS) upside 
down.  The decades-old “threat-driven,” “bottom-up” development process of warfare-
materiel requirements was summarily replaced by a “revolutionary,” “capabilities-
driven,” “top-down” process.    
Historically, the Service-unique requirements development processes and 
organizations and their entrenched institutional memories had been forcibly altered, with 
the imposition of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and CINC 
participation, by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (hereafter cited as Goldwater-
Nichols).  Then, 17 years later, this Act was suddenly superseded by a new and rapidly-
evolving DOD/JCS-driven process and organization. 
Such a drastic change must have had very complex origins; and indeed it did.  
Chapter II will thoroughly explore this highly-political metamorphosis.  
Chapter III will provide an “executive summary” of JCIDS (including the March 
2004 Change 1) and highlight significant changes from the legacy system.  It will also 
emphasize the nearly-concurrent changes made to the DoD 5000 series governing 
acquisition management that were either forced by, or made in correlation with, the 
JCIDS “revolution.” 
Such change has caused many to be concerned that JCIDS may be trying to 
resolve legacy RGS problems and disconnections in a manner that may potentially be 
injecting new, equally-disruptive deficiencies. Chapter IV will then provide an analysis, 
from a Program Manager’s (PM) perspective, of the potential impacts of these changes 
upon the acquisition community.   
Chapter V will present conclusions and offer recommendations for possible 
adjustments to JCIDS.  
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II. Historical Background 
Modern American military history is replete with examples of weapon systems 
that proved to be either inadequate or inferior when confronted with serious hostilities.  
There was a complex spectrum of reasons for these situations, ranging from failures to 
recognize the militarily-significant applications of emerging technologies, to faulty 
intelligence and threat identification, to inadequate developmental and operational 
testing; the early WW-II Mark XIV Submarine Torpedo fiasco is a very painful example 
of the latter.   
That war also saw the rise of joint and combined operations and the formation of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  Yet, equipment developed parochially by one of the two 
Services frequently failed to adequately inter-operate with the other’s in-joint systems.  
Early WW-II problems with performing amphibious operations and obtaining effective 
Naval gunfire support for the Marines and Army provide vivid examples.  Various 
attempts were made at two-Service and, after 1947, three-Service cooperation in 
requirements generation.  These efforts were judged by many to have been largely 
unproductive.1 
Behind this lack of successful cooperation existed a long history of Service 
parochialism, arrogance, and competitive in-fighting.  The contention between the 
fledgling “B-36 Air Force” versus the “carrier admirals” in 1948-49 is a vicious case-in-
point.  The inter-Service conflicts and myriad Congressional interferences literally drove 
the first Secretary of Defense (and former Secretary of the Navy), James Forrestal, to 
suicide.   
 
                                            
1 For instance, only in this decade has a requirement to extend the organic Army and Marine Corps 
artillery fire support system to Naval surface vessels—thus eliminating the decades-old requirement for a 
dedicated Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) element to accompany all ground combat 
commanders—been approved, funded, and nearly completed; they will shortly be provided with a single, 
common “call for indirect fire support” system for the first time ever. 
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Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, and their Secretaries of Defense, vainly 
struggled with the Services and many in Congress to empower the Department of 
Defense and to inculcate “jointness” and improved inter-Service cooperation.  Despite 
the Key West Agreement of 1947, the still-autonomous Services continued to try to 
“poach” other Service’s roles and missions.  What was “good for the Service” far 
transcended what was “good for the DoD.” 
President Eisenhower tried to deal with this Service intransigence in his national 
security initiatives that resulted in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.  He tried to 
strengthen the power of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the 
Unified Commanders (CINCs). He felt strengthening these positions would increase the 
integration of the Services in support of JCS strategic plans and the Unified CINCs.  
Congress, however, was not ready for a major transformation and passed a diluted bill 
that initiated few substantial changes. 
Later, President Kennedy empowered Secretary McNamara to reform the 
Pentagon’s requirements generation and resource allocation/management processes 
by both introducing the “Whiz Kids” with their systems-effectiveness analysis and by 
imposing a formal Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) for the DoD.  
Although some limited further joint rationalization occurred, Kennedy’s assassination 
and President Johnson’s subsequent focus on “The Great Society,” and increasingly on 
Viet Nam, basically acquiesced the administration to the DoD status quo. 
President Nixon was likewise enmeshed in Viet Nam and, subsequently, his very 
survival in office.  President Ford served only two years, and President Carter, although 
a former Regular Navy Officer, had other priorities.  Then came the Iranian hostage-
taking and the joint Service “Desert One” failure; these led to the beginning of a transfer 
in the impetus for DoD/JCS reform from the Executive Branch to the dissatisfied and 
increasingly-concerned Legislative.  As the Regan administration began their sweeping 
defense build-up, the 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks bombing tragedy occurred; likewise, 
the disjointed Grenada Invasion again revealed serious shortcomings in the Services’ 
ability to act effectively and unselfishly in the conduct of joint operations. 
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Many in Congress, already concerned about the effects of Service parochialism, 
saw these incidents as evidence that the DoD required major reforms in its capability to 
equip, organize, and execute joint operations in the defense of the country. Therefore, 
they called for a major reorganization.  Several critics asserted that Service autonomy 
was going to have to be sacrificed in the interests of improved effectiveness in the joint 
arena. 
Late 1983 saw the commencement of a series of hearings in both houses of 
Congress that would culminate three years later in the landmark Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation (the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986).  During the latter part of this 
period, in July 1985, President Regan chartered the Packard Commission to investigate 
the DoD’s procedures and activities for the procurement of military equipment and 
materiel.  The commission staff, as well as some members of Congress, directly 
coordinated their investigations with the inquiries of the relevant House and Senate 
committees and their staffs.  
 The work of both bodies significantly parallel and overlap in the portions of the 
legislation and commission report that pertain to requirements generation and 
acquisition management.  The Congressional emphasis on “jointness” in requirements 
generation dovetailed tightly into the Packard Commission’s recommendations on 
acquisition management reform. 
Over vehement Service protests, particularly those of the Navy and its die-hard 
coterie of Congressional supporters, Goldwater-Nichols established the permanent 
position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS).  Among the new 
position’s specified duties was the responsibility to preside as the Chairman of the 
newly-created Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) which consisted of all of 
the Service Vice Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps 
and which was facilitated by a small, permanent staff.  The JROC’s charter was, with 
input from the Unified Commands’ CINCs, to oversee the materiel requirements 
documentation validation process for all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) 
[classified by the DoD as Acquisition Category I (ACAT I)] and to authenticate that the 
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proposed capability was required, not duplicative of another Service’s program, and that 
the submitted documentation adequately addressed all DoD/JCS-level joint-warfare and 
inter-operability concerns.  
The second new major VCJCS acquisition-related duty was to serve concurrently 
as Vice Chairman of the newly-created Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) which was 
chaired by the also newly-created Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE).  The DAB, an 
outgrowth from the former Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), had 
been created to advise the DAE—as the DoD Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)—
concerning the readiness of developmental programs to advance into the next 
acquisition-management phase.  These two principal duties assigned to the office of the 
VCJCS promised significantly increased DoD/JCS influence over the Service-initiated 
requirements generation and Service-managed acquisition-management processes.  
Goldwater-Nichols also promulgated a major change in the Services’ acquisition 
management systems.  Although the 1976 OMB Circular A-109 (which established 
Executive Branch acquisition management policy) had required all agencies to establish 
short, clear lines of acquisition responsibility, authority, and accountability, as of 1986, 
the DoD had still not institutionalized this policy. Therefore, embracing a Packard 
Commission recommendation in order to assist the DoD’s acquisition management 
policy, the legislation required the adoption of what has become known as the “PEO 
System.”  In this system, lines of acquisition management authority and oversight 
flowed from a Service-chartered Program Manager (PM) to a commodity-oriented 
Program Executive Officer (PEO) overseeing a cluster of related PMs, to a Service 
Acquisition Executive (SAE), and finally to the DAE.  The existing Service Hardware 
Systems Commands (HSCs) were to provide support to the PMs on a matrix basis and 
be reimbursed by program funds which, in another major change, would now flow 
through the PEO chain. 
The PEO System, once fully implemented, constituted a significant improvement 
in acquisition management and accountability; it was and still is considered a success.  
However, the inauguration of the JROC Requirements Oversight “System” proved to be 
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more difficult and controversial.  ADM William A. “Bill” Owens was appointed as the third 
VJCS and, therefore, Chairman of the JROC.  Press reports from the period relate that 
the JROC meetings were characterized by rancor and parochial in-fighting. These 
reports likewise suggest ADM Owens became increasingly frustrated by Service 
intransigence and his inability to orchestrate a joint consensus on many issues which, in 
order to achieve improved commonality and interoperability, required serious Service 
concessions and compromises.  Sandra Irwin, in National Defense, states ADM Owens: 
created what he called the JWCA, or joint warfighting capabilities assessment, 
that was designed to more closely match the needs of joint commanders with the 
services’ procurement priorities.  The JWCA didn’t achieve the expected results, 
officials claim, because it was a ”bottom-up” review process that began at service 
level and ended at the JROC.2   
Press reports asserted that both these prolonged frustrations, and severe 
Service criticism of his efforts, were the principal reasons that he declined nomination 
for a second two-year term as VJCS.3  Yet, Owens wasn’t the reason the JWCA didn’t 
survive.: 
But the real reason why JWCA was only a passing fad—and why JCIDS may 
encounter a similar fate—is that ultimately the services have ownership of their 
programs and the responsibility to justify them before Congress.  The Navy’s 
littoral combat ship [LCS] program is a particularly relevant illustration of the 
challenge that the services face in getting major programs off the ground.  While 
LCS critics on Capitol Hill charge that the Navy has done a poor job validating 
and articulating the need for the ship, the program passed the JCIDS review with 
flying colors and then some. 
                                            
2 Sandra Irwin, “Pentagon Takes Another Shot at Enforcing Joint Thinking,” National Defense (AUG 04): 
quoted in the Early Bird, 28 JUL 04   
3 Note: The foreword to Victory on the Potomac relates the extreme rancor that the JCS members 
personally expressed at Senators Goldwater and Nunn during a 1986 confrontation in the “Tank;” 
Goldwater at one point responded by slamming his cane on the table!  It is no wonder the JWCA was 
doomed to failure.   
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At the very least […]JCIDS will serve as a valuable forum to debate the 
relevance of major programs in a joint context, which certainly has merit.  But 
some still wonder about a process that apparently ignores the long-standing 
relationship the services have with the movers and shakers on Capitol Hill.4  
Subsequent Administrations shared the same frustrations with the RGS. These 
frustrations culminated in the current Administration with Defense Secretary Rumsfield’s 
initiative to radically transform the legacy system.  The initiative grew out of studies 
conducted early in the Bush Administration aimed at improving the responsiveness of 
the acquisition management system.  These studies concluded that the RGS was also  
part of the low-responsiveness problem.  The Service-initiated “bottom-up” system was 
not conducive to commonality, inter-operability, and “jointness.”  Therefore, Secretary 
Rumsfield decided to direct the JCS to take responsibility for initiating materiel 
requirements from the top-down to ensure that requirements were “born joint.” 
                                            
4 Sandra Irwin, “Pentagon Takes Another Shot at Enforcing Joint Thinking,” National Defense (AUG 04): 
quoted in the Early Bird, 28 JUL 04   
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III. Joint Capabilities Integration Development 
System (JCIDS) 
The newly-released National Military Strategy (NMS), “A Strategy for Today; A 
Vision for Tomorrow,” clearly articulates the strategy and vision from which JCIDS was 
derived. 
The Foreword highlights protecting the United States, preventing conflict, and 
prevailing against adversaries.  The Chairman, USAF General Richard B. Myers, sets 
forth three priorities.  The first is winning the war on terrorism, which will require “the 
full integration of all instruments of national power.”  The second is enhancing our 
ability to fight as a joint force.  He asserts, “Joint teamwork is an integral part of our 
culture and focus as we develop leaders, organizations, systems, and doctrine” (italics 
added). The third is transforming the Armed Forces by ensuring that “US forces 
emerge from the struggle against terrorism with our joint force fully prepared to meet 
future global challenges.”5  
In Chapter V, Joint Vision for Future Warfighting, the NMS introduces the goal 
of Full Spectrum Dominance (FSD). It states: 
FSD recognizes the need to integrate military activities with those of other 
government agencies, the importance of interoperability with allies and other 
partners, and the criticality of transforming in-stride.  FSD will serve to strengthen 
the trust and confidence that exists among service components by 
acknowledging their interdependence and developing concepts that reduce gaps 
and seams among organizations.  It requires a capabilities-based approach that 
balances near-term capabilities with longer-term requirements and incorporates a 
global perspective on military and strategic risk.  […] Along with technological 
solutions to improve joint Warfighting, we must also examine our doctrine, 
                                            
5 National Military Strategy (NMS), “A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow,” add more info to this 
citation. (emphasis added) 
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organizations, training systems, materiel procurement […] to ensure military 
superiority.  […] Reducing lead times associated with research, development, 
and fielding of new capabilities must be a priority.  Such actions are essential to 
an in-stride approach to transforming the Joint Force and executing concepts for 
future joint Warfighting.  Research and development programs are equally 
important to FSD, providing a hedge against the more uncertain aspects of the 
security environment. 6 
Perhaps the best recent summary of JCIDS’ intent and basic architecture can be 
found in an excerpt from an October 8, 2004 article from Inside the Pentagon that is 
quoted below. The unnamed author explains the system as follows:  
The Joint Training FCB (Functional Capabilities Board) is the eighth such panel 
created by the Pentagon.  The others cover command and control, battlespace 
awareness, force application, force protection, force management, focused 
logistics and network-centric operations.  These activities are prevalent in the full 
range of missions the Defense Department carries out. 
Each board plays a central role in crafting an array of capabilities for future 
warfighters under the Pentagon's year-old Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System, or JCIDS for short. 
JCIDS, as spelled out in a revised Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction 3170, was implemented to replace a defense-wide requirements 
generation system that was widely viewed as flawed because it did not 
adequately support efforts to field a more effective joint force (Inside the 
Pentagon, July 24, 2003, p3).  This was a concern because military planners 
believe the services—and the equipment they use—must be able to work 
together seamlessly to defeat 21st-century threats. 
                                            
6 Ibid., 20-21 (emphasis added).   
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To that end, the JCIDS process encourages interoperability at the earliest stages 
of program development—a proposal from one of the services to build a new 
weapon system, for instance, would be judged in large part on how it could 
contribute to joint warfighting, as opposed to just the needs of that service.  
Officials also will guard against unnecessary duplication of effort by the services, 
thereby promoting efficiency in the expenditure of DOD resources. 
Much of the heavy work of vetting proposals to field new capabilities is the 
province of FCBs, which can include representatives from the Joint Staff, Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, the services and combatant commands.  The 
boards support Pentagon decision-makers—including the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council and the Joint Capabilities Board—in analyzing and prioritizing 
proposed warfighting requirements. Further, they will help identify shortfalls and 
gaps in existing or projected joint capabilities. 
Here's how it works: Much of the activity that flows to the FCBs will be assigned 
by an official known as the JCIDS "gatekeeper."  This person examines each 
capabilities proposal—perhaps in the form of an initial capabilities document, 
which replaced the mission need statements used under the old requirements 
generation system—to assess what the chairman's instruction calls "joint 
potential." 
The gatekeeper then tags each proposal "JROC interest," "joint impact," or 
"independent."  The designation determines who will be responsible for validating 
and approving the document—the JROC, an FCB or a DOD component.  
Certification requirements for interoperability and staffing distribution also are 
considered. 
The JROC interest label applies to all acquisition category-1/1A (sic) programs, 
which already are subject to JROC oversight.  Joint impact is applied to all 
ACAT-2 and below programs "where the concepts and/or systems associated 
with the document affect the joint force such that an expanded review is 
appropriate in order to ensure" the best solution for the joint warfighter, the 
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instruction states.  The independent designation is intended for ACAT-2 and 
below programs that do not affect the joint force and do not require certifications, 
according to the instruction. 
The gatekeeper also picks the lead FCB to handle analysis of a particular 
proposal. 
FCBs also develop and update functional concepts that, along with strategic 
policy direction from OSD, guide decisions about capabilities proposals.”7  
In addition to the concise explanation quoted above, CJCSI 3170.01D, 12 March 
2004, provides the details concerning JCIDS and will not be repeated here.  However, 































KM/DS - Knowledge Management/Decision Support Tool
JPD – Joint Potential Designator  
Figure 1.  JCIDS Review and Validation Process (NPS Course MN3331) 
JCIDS was developed concurrently with a major overhaul of the Acquisition 
Management System.  Beginning in the closing years of the Clinton Administration, the 
                                            
7 “New JCIDS Functional Capabilities Board.” Inside the Pentagon  (October 8, 2004): quoted in the Early 
Bird  08 NOV 04.  
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Acquisition Model started to significantly evolve.  This evolution culminated in the May 
2003 publication of a significantly revised DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2.  Publication 
of the initial version of the new CJCSI 3170.01 establishing JCIDS followed a month 
later.  The details and implications of this JCIDS-inspired management model are 
thoroughly discussed in John T. Dillard’s 2003 Report: “Centralized Control of Defense 
Acquisition Programs: A Comparative Review of the Framework from 1987–2003.” 
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IV. Analysis from the Program Manager’s Perspective 
Note: This reviewer was Project Manager (PM) of a Major Defense Acquisition 
Program (MDAP) in the mid-1990’s and has been teaching Materiel Acquisition and 
Program Management at the Naval Postgraduate School for over ten years.  The 
following analysis is reflective of experience in the surface-to-surface rocket and guided 
missile commodity.  It is also influenced by the experiences of former-PM colleagues 
and by feedback from former students currently serving in mainstream acquisition 
positions in the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and the DoD. 
The first concern of this analysis is how the Pentagon-based JCIDS process is 
going to capture the institutional memory and lessons learned (some more than once) 
resident in the old RGS bureaucracy.  How will the legacy knowledge and expertise (We 
tried that “good idea,” but it did not work because…) be preserved and accessed?  The 
old shibboleth that the “devil’s in the details” is certainly applicable here, as is the axiom 
that “the project failed because we built the wrong thing…” Then, the inevitable question 
follows: Why did we build the “wrong thing?”, as does the answer: because “they” did 
not get the requirement “right.”   
Ensuring that we “get the requirement right” is the core of this concern.  
Measures in the new acquisition management model emphasize achieving and 
demonstrating technological maturity prior to final commitment to a developmental 
program; lack of technological maturity has certainly been a major problem in many past 
programs.  However, another major requirements problem that adversely affected the 
PM’s ability to meet his/her mandated Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)—the 
problem, of “requirements creep”—appears to have been institutionalized in JCIDS.  
The evolution of the specific requirement from the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) to 
its codification in the Capabilities Development Document (CDD) to the “final” (for the 
first increment anyway) Capabilities Production Document (CPD), represents new 
ground for PMs.  Under the legacy requirements and management systems, what is 
now the CDD (roughly the old ORD, but now occurring somewhat later in the 
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developmental cycle) “froze” the qualification to enable the PM to execute the Program 
Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) and Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) phases with a stable requirement.  Now, with the new CPD, the 
requirement actually “freezes” later on, somewhere between the Critical Design Review 
(CDR) and Milestone C, here commitment is made to Low-Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP).  In addition, the CDR, where the design is “frozen,” now comes somewhat later 
in the developmental cycle, affording the PM less time to complete and extensively 
integrate and test the system; this decreased leeway for testing and integration 
potentially increases program risk.   
The reasons for these changes are well-intended and have the laudable 
objective of deploying the latest technology to the warfighter.  However, for every “pro” 
there is a “con.”  Particularly, given the increasing software-intensity of major defense 
systems and the extensive integration testing inherently required for those technological 
systems, there is potentially more risk here than the framers of the new system may 
have realized because of the decreased time frame.  Software integration testing is 
predominately serial and therefore schedule-intensive; one can not accurately forecast 
a final completion date until it actually arrives.  Therefore, adequate schedule 
“management reserve” must be provided in order to avoid a baseline breach.  
A second concern is that the Key Performance Parameters (KPP) under JCIDS 
will probably focus significantly more upon interoperability and “jointness” than they had 
in the past.  The PM for a MDAP may have to increasingly rely upon other PMs outside 
of his PEO, or even Service, to provide key components and/or other critical 
subsystems to his higher-level system precisely on his schedule in order to meet his 
KPP thresholds.  The March 12, 2004 version of CJCSI 3170.01D specifically highlights 
the mandated interdependencies of materiel developers. It states: 
Potential solutions may include a family of systems (FoS) that take different 
approaches to filling the capability gap, each addressing operational 
considerations in a different way.  Alternatively, the solution may require a 
system of systems (SoS) approach to fill a capability gap.  The FoS and SoS 
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material solutions may also require systems delivered by multiple 
sponsors/materiel developers.8  
In other words, the desired “jointness” of the Service inherently catalyzes materiel 
interdependency among them.   
Another paragraph of the March 12, 2004 version stipulates that requirements 
documents “will comply with the formal instructions in CJCSI 3170.01B and incorporate 
the Interoperability/Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter (KPP) as required by 
reference g.  The transition from the Interoperability KPP to the Net-Ready KPP is 
directed by the instructions in JROCM 236-03, 19 December 2003.”9  The imposition of 
this Net-Ready KPP will further exacerbate the PM interdependency situation by 
requiring PM’s to develop unprogramed, newly-required interface capabilities with other 
PM’s systems. 
With virtually no formal control over these supporting PMs, how can/will the 
system’s PM be held responsible/accountable?  Will the Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) approve exit from or entrance into a phase in the event that these supporting 
PMs fail to meet their schedules, and thereby prevent the system PM from meeting 
some KPP?  Will the JROC endorse a diminished-capability requirement for the initial 
increment, and will the MDA approve a rebaselined Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy 
that increases incrementalism?  Will the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
(DOT&E) declare the less-capable initial-increment fully operationally effective and 
suitable? 
The above concerns may eventually turn out to be somewhat overstated, but with 
both JCIDS and the complementing 5000 series being relatively immature in terms of 
application to real-world materiel development programs, considerable skepticism 
persists in the PM community.  Only application of the new paradigms to actual 
                                            
8 CJCSI 3170.01D, “Joint Capabilities Integration Development System,” March 12, 2004. 2 (Para 4c.) 
9 Ibid., 3 (Para 4 f.3).    
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programs and a thorough evaluation of their impacts will illustrate the extent and validity 
of these concerns. 
A third concern with this new paradigm is that under the new  Evolutionary 
Acquisition Strategy and the DoD-preferred “Spiral Development” method, the potential 
exists for a plethora of low densities of somewhat different configurations of major 
systems being serially deployed to the fleet.  This would require a separately-tailored 
logistical support package for each discrete model.  RADM (Ret) Don Eaton, holder of 
the Admiral Stanley Arthur NPS Logistics Chair, often recounts to his classes his 
experiences, when he was the senior logistical at the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR), with aircraft carriers deployed with several different blocks of FA-18 aircraft.  
A portion of the logistics “footprint” for each block consisted of block-unique test 
equipment, spares, and sometimes even seaman ratings.  Acquiring enough storage 
space for the aggregated “footprints” of all the FA-18s on board presented a 
considerable challenge.  He described one instance where NAVAIR procured only 12 of 
one particular FA-18 block; then, when one aircraft was lost operationally, a single 
squadron had to support two different configurations in order to remain at full strength 
on deployments.  RADM Eaton remains concerned that the new paradigm will 
inadvertently result in increased operation and maintenance (O&M) costs and possibly 
even require carrier design modifications in order to accommodate the multiplicity of 
unique models.  Acquiring and maintaining a large range of relatively-expensive, but 
low-density support equipment and repair parts will preclude taking advantage of 
potential “economies of scale” and probably result in a significant increase in Total 
Ownership Costs (TOC).10 
One option to address this problem is to retrofit legacy models to the current 
configuration, which would reduce O&S costs and enhance combat effectiveness, 
reliability, and operational availability.  However, at least in the case of NAVAIR, this 
                                            
10 Conversations with RADM (Ret) Eaton, 1994 to present. 
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has not been the historic norm; monetary resources required from the Procurement 
Appropriations would have to be diverted from the acquisition of brand-new aircraft. 
A final concern revolves around funding.  Under Title 10 U.S. Code, the 
Congress still appropriates directly to the Services, not to the DoD.  For decades, the 
Congress has received the President’s Budget and then decremented, pulsed-up, or 
even added programs in congruence with their parochial special interests.  Therefore, 
the carefully-crafted R&D, Procurement, and MILCON decisions made in the JCS and 
the DoD that are reflected in the President’s Budget are occasionally not realized in the 
annual Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts.  The Services have, in the past, 
publicly supported the President’s Budget while concurrently working covertly behind 
the scenes with their respective major system contractor lobbyists to reverse on the Hill 
the very decisions that they lost through unfavorable DoD Program Budget Decisions 
(PBD).11  The programs that become “bill-payers” to more fully fund these priority 
Service programs are in some cases those programs providing support to other 
Services. Rep. Aspen cited as examples reluctant Navy and Air Force support for 
Strategic Sea and Air Lift to deploy the Army.12   PMs, dependent upon other-Service-
funded components and/or subsystems in order to meet their KPPs may, therefore, find 
these programs decremented during Congressional enactment and suffer a baseline 
breach. In other words, jointness and across-the-board Service interoperability may 
prove to be more difficult to achieve than the visionary JCIDS framers anticipated.   
 
                                            
11 This problem was so significant that when Senator William “Bill” Cohen became Dr. William Perry’s 
successor in the late 90s, one of his very first acts was to circulate a memorandum to the Services 
emphatically emphasizing that there would no inappropriate contacts with the Congress in contravention 
of the President’s Budget!   
12 Representative Les Aspen of Wisconsin, when Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, as 
quoted in “The Pentagon Power Game,” PBS Video (1987). 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
First, there has been a “revolution” in the requirements generation process that 
needs to avoid “throwing out the baby with the bathwater.”  Legacy knowledge and 
experience needs to be carefully considered when formulating requirements in the 
JCIDS process.  It is recommended that the JCS and Service staffs quickly act to take 
the necessary policy and bureaucratic steps to ensure JCIDS entities have 
institutionalized access to the legacy corporate memories and records of both the 
former Service RGS staffs and records on a real-time, or at least near real-time, basis.  
This would insure that all of the potential impacts and previously-learned lessons would 
be reviewed and considered in the formulation of all new JCIDS requirements 
documents. 
Second, there is the issue of developmental PM dependence upon other PMs, 
over whom they have little or no control, for on-time delivery of crucial subsystems and 
components in order to meet their KPPs.  It is recommended that a mandatory entry be 
established in the quarterly Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) report.  
This entry would identify and provide the status of a system for both the other-PM-
managed systems that the reporting PM was depending on to achieve his/her KPPs; it 
would also include the status of any subsystems or components that the reporting PM 
was managing that were critical to some other PMs’ ability to meet his/her KPP 
requirements.  Since the DAES report is reviewed and commented upon by the 
reporting PM’s PEO, Service Acquisition Executive (SAE), and subsequently, the 
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), this mandatory communicative entry would 
ensure that immediate visibility was given to any projected schedule and/or cost 
shortfalls in time to have them addressed (at whatever level where necessary) to effect 
their timely resolution. 
Third, since it is clear that the new evolutionary materiel requirements and 
development system has enormous potential for increasing the operation and support 
cost components of Total Ownership Cost (TOC), the reduction of them needs to be 
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addressed during the early steps in the new system’s engineering process.  It is 
therefore recommended that the Services be directed to formulate both a 
comprehensive Logistics Support Strategy and a Master Configuration Management 
Plan, as well as a Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) analysis for each JCIDS 
requirements document.  These plans could then be crafted to produce the lowest 
practical Total Ownership Cost (TOC) for the full lifecycle of the developmental system. 
Finally, it is apparent that significant potential exists for the congress to 
“disconnect” carefully-balanced DoD JCIDS materiel program Research, Development, 
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Production budget requests during the enactment 
process.  Therefore, it is recommended that the DoD clearly highlights, in its portion of 
the President’s Budget, those RDT&E and Procurement programs that have critical 
interdependencies and which should be funded as a “package” to ensure that those 
programs can stay on their approved Acquisition Program Baselines (APB).    
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